A Comment on the Admissibility of Forensic Evidence
R. Erik Lillquist∗
There appears to be little doubt that the law of expert evidence
has an odd dichotomy.
As Professor Giannelli notes in his
contribution to this Symposium, courts presently are willing to admit
forensic evidence, such as fingerprint evidence and hair evidence,
under circumstances that would not permit the admission of similar
1
evidence in a civil case. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has failed
to impose meaningful constitutional constraints on the admissibility
2
of prosecutorial expert evidence. The result is that defendants in
civil litigation are more successful in excluding plaintiffs’ expert
evidence than criminal defendants are in excluding the government’s
expert evidence. This seems to be at odds with our fundamental
presumption that courts should be more, not less, protective of
criminal defendants than civil defendants.
In response to the divergent approaches to expert evidence law
in criminal and civil cases, contributors to this Symposium suggest
several reforms. First, Professors Friedman, Giannelli, Denbeaux,
and Risinger argue that the standards for the admissibility of expert
evidence the government offers ought to be heightened to at least
3
the level required of the plaintiff in a civil case. Indeed, Professor
Friedman would go further and require even more reliability for
4
government expert evidence. Second, Professor Friedman suggests
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much lower standards for the admissibility of defense expert
5
testimony.
Adopting such proposals, I believe, risks unintended
consequences that may worsen, rather than improve, the lot of
(innocent) criminal defendants. Changes to the laws of admissibility
of expert evidence in criminal cases do not occur in a vacuum.
Rather, they occur against a mosaic of other criminal procedural
rules and actors, which may be affected by a change to a particular
rule. Although it is perhaps impossible to predict the precise effects
of such changes, I want to suggest two troubling possibilities.
First, lowering the standards for admitting defense expert
evidence in criminal cases may well lead to more, not fewer,
erroneous convictions of criminal defendants. Admitting more
defense expert evidence ought to lower the conviction rate, both for
guilty and innocent defendants. It is conceivable that this change in
the conviction rate will give rise to other changes in criminal
procedure that will ratchet the conviction rate back up. Such a
change, however, may result in more inaccurate convictions than
occurred prior to the initial change. The overall result would then
seem to be negative, not positive.
Second, I want to suggest that there may be good reasons to
reject the “best evidence” arguments advanced by Professors
Friedman and Giannelli: courts ought to exclude forensic evidence to
6
give the government an incentive to engage in validation research.
As they both note, criminal procedure is different than civil
procedure, and that includes the incentives of the actual actors. The
unique considerations of criminal procedure may militate in favor of
not changing the existing system based on speculation that more
validation testing might be forthcoming.
I. THE EFFECT OF LOWERING THE STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE
EXPERTS
Criminal procedure consists of a complex set of rules and
privileges that, taken together, attempt to strike an appropriate
balance between protecting defendants from inaccurate convictions
7
and allowing society to punish those who have committed crimes.
5

See id.
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But just because the system as a whole seeks to achieve such a balance
does not mean that individual rights are always set up in a way that
the particular rule, viewed in isolation, strikes such a balance.
Rather, the right may weigh against other rights (or the absence of
other rights) to create the overall balance. The question with the
unknown answer is whether altering the rules for the admissibility of
forensic evidence has unanticipated consequences for this
equilibrium.
As Professor Friedman notes, criminal procedure is much
different than civil procedure, and despite the fact that both criminal
and civil trials are held under the same rules of evidence, the actual
application of those rules in civil and criminal trials can be
8
dissimilar.
Perhaps the two most fundamental differences in
criminal and civil litigation are the privilege against self-incrimination
and the Double Jeopardy Clause, both of which are very pro9
defendant. As courts have interpreted the privilege, it ensures that
the defendant need never—before or at trial—tell the government or
10
the court his side of the story (absent a grant of immunity). To
protect this privilege, the Supreme Court has held that the
prosecutor cannot argue to the jurors, nor can the trial judge instruct
11
them, that they can infer the defendant’s guilt from his silence. The
result of this state of affairs in criminal procedure is that the person
with the most relevant information about the alleged crime
frequently never speaks at the trial.
The Double Jeopardy Clause also influences the shape of
criminal procedure because it has been interpreted as forbidding the
12
government from appealing from a verdict of not guilty.
As
Professor Kate Stith has noted, however, there are collateral
13
consequences from this right. First, there may be a “selection effect”
that results from the asymmetric nature of the right to appeal in
for purposes of this Comment I will assume agreement on this point.
8
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9
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10
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result protects the right of the jury to nullify. See Peter Westen, The Three Faces of
Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV.
1001, 1018 (1980). For an elaboration of other justifications for the rule, see GEORGE
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13
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Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1990).
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14

criminal cases. Furthermore, because judges only have a risk of
reversal from decisions against the defendant, judges may often have
an incentive to err on the side of the defendant. In cases involving
novel issues, though, the tendency may be the reverse: a progovernment bias. One need not agree with any of Professor Stith’s
conclusions to acknowledge that her premise has unsettling
consequences for criminal justice. Even if one thinks that the
asymmetric right to appeal generally favors the government, and not
the defendant, the results are individual legal rules that differ from
15
what otherwise would be normatively preferred.
Of course, the common reaction to the distinction between civil
and criminal litigation is to assume that in criminal litigation the
government’s job ought to be made harder, and the defendant’s
easier, than in civil litigation. For example, in this Symposium
Professor Friedman argues for heightened admissibility standards for
the prosecution and lowered admissibility standards for the defense
in criminal cases. This argument is based, in part, on his assumption
that there is a “shared perception that the social cost of an inaccurate
judgment, given that the defendant is in fact innocent, is many times
greater than the social cost of an inaccurate judgment given that the
16
defendant is in fact guilty.”
In particular, he argues that the
possibility of erroneous convictions justifies lenient admissibility of
expert evidence for the defense. I believe it is far from clear that the
rule ought to be tilted in the way he suggests.
I have argued extensively elsewhere that the “social cost” logic is
17
at best incomplete and perhaps wrong.
This conception of the
weighing of social costs is most frequently raised, as Professor
Friedman himself raises it, to justify the “very high” standard of proof
18
in criminal cases: proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
In reality,

14

Id. at 18-19.
For instance, some may argue that the rules of search and seizure may be
warped in a pro-government fashion by the fact that all individuals asserting such
issues on appeal have been found guilty. Given that the search and seizure rules
themselves tend to exclude otherwise relevant evidence of guilt, appellate courts may
be quite reluctant to overturn a seemingly accurate conviction based on a
“technicality.” Were appellate courts to view such cases when brought by plausibly
innocent defendants, they might be more open to such claims. This is an argument I
first heard made by Bill Stuntz.
16
Friedman, supra note 3, at 1049.
17
See Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of
Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85 (2002).
18
See Friedman, supra note 3, at 1049. As Professor Friedman notes, it is also
frequently raised to justify the preponderance of the evidence standard in civil cases.
Id.
15
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however, it is quite difficult to justify a high standard of proof using
such logic. This is in part because, as Professor Laurence Tribe long
ago noted, in addition to weighing the social costs of erroneous
convictions, one must also weigh the social benefits of accurate
19
convictions. Once social benefits are included in the calculation, it
becomes much more difficult to decide where to set the standard of
proof: very high, or perhaps not so high at all. And this is true
20
regardless of one’s overarching theory of criminal law.
Outside of the realm of the standard of proof, it is even harder
to locate criminal justice rules that seek only to avoid the costs of
erroneous convictions. If that was the only goal of the criminal
21
justice system, one might expect, for instance, that the right to pretrial discovery in criminal cases would be weighted heavily in favor of
the defense. After all, granting defendants extensive discovery rights
would aid their defense and maximize the chances for an acquittal,
while restrictive discovery rights for prosecutors would also protect
defendants. But this is not what we find. In many jurisdictions, the
rights to pre-trial discovery in criminal cases are restrictive for both
22
the government and the defense. So, for instance, the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure provide for generally symmetric discovery.
The government must turn over, at the request of the defendant, (a)
any statements of the defendant, (b) a copy of the defendant’s prior
record, (c) any documents or tangible things in the possession of the
government that are either “material to the preparation of the
defendant’s defense or are intended for use by the government as
evidence in chief at trial, or were obtained from or belong to the
defendant,” (d) any reports of examinations or tests that are material
to the defendant’s defense or are intended to be used by the
government in its case at trial, and finally (e) a written summary of
23
any expert testimony.
If the defendant requests such evidence,
though, he must turn over to the government (upon the
government’s request) evidence that falls into categories (c), (d), and

19

Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision & Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1378-81 (1971).
20
See Lillquist, supra note 17, at 130-46.
21
Some retributivists might argue that “acquitting the innocent is a constraint on
achieving the general aim of increasing the common good.” Lillquist, supra note 17,
at 141. But it seems implicit in such claims that other moral commitments to society
and to victims must also be valued, and perhaps weighed against this constraint. Id.
at 142.
22
See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS § 24.01 (4th ed. 2000).
23
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1).
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24

(e).
Beyond this, the government is obligated under Brady v.
25
Maryland and its progeny to turn over evidence that, if it were not
turned over, would create a reasonable probability that the result of
26
the proceeding would be different. Functionally, this merely means
that if the government fails to turn over information favorable to the
defense, the conviction will be vacated only if there is a reasonable
probability that with the evidence, the defendant might have been
acquitted. Finally, the government is obliged, under 18 U.S.C. §
3500, to turn over any statement by one of its witnesses, but not until
27
after the conclusion of the witness’s direct examination.
Notably excluded from the evidence that the government must
turn over are reports written by law enforcement officers or
government attorneys that do not fall into the categories mentioned
above, as well as any record of the proceedings before the grand
28
jury.
The latter restriction, when combined with § 3500’s
requirement that statements by government witnesses need not be
turned over until after the completion of the direct examination and
the fact that the federal system, at least, does not require the
29
government to disclose its witnesses prior to trial ensures that the
defendant may have little information, prior to trial, as to the case the
30
government has against him. Of course, in practice, information
about government witnesses and their statements, even in the federal
31
system, are often made available at least a short time before trial.
But even when this fact is taken into account, it remains true that,
unlike civil litigation, the government’s witnesses need not speak to
the defense. Thus, the disclosure of information in criminal
litigation is very different than civil litigation, where the defendant
and the plaintiff are entitled to vast amounts of information about
32
each other’s cases long in advance of trial.
24

FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1).
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
26
See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). For an extensive treatment of
Brady and the cases after it, see WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 22, at § 24.04.
27
See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (2000). The defendant has a similar burden. See FED.
R. CRIM. P. 26.2.
28
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2) & (3).
29
There is a limited right to the witnesses list prior to trial in capital cases, but
none otherwise. 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (2000).
30
Except, of course, for the defendant’s own statements to the government.
31
Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Discovery of Jenks Witness Statements: Timing Makes a
Difference, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 678-92 (1999).
32
Professor John Douglass has recently argued that, in fact, discovery rights are
skewed in favor of the government, once one takes into account the ability of the
government to obtain information through the use of the grand jury and police
25
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Even in states where more liberal discovery is available—for
instance, in New Jersey—it remains true that the discovery rights of
the government and the defense are roughly symmetrical. Thus, in
New Jersey the defendant is entitled to summaries of his unrecorded
statements, lists of any persons known to have relevant information
and statements by such people, as well as police reports, all of which
33
might not be available in the federal system. But in return, the
defendant is expected to provide all relevant documents in the
defendant’s possession; a list of all persons who might be called as
witnesses, as well as their written statements or any memoranda
summarizing those statements; and any written statements of the
government’s witnesses or memoranda summarizing such statements,
34
that are in the possession of the defendant. In a state such as New
York, with more limited discovery rights (but perhaps more liberal
than those in the federal system), the rights also tend to be relatively
35
symmetric.
Of course, in many jurisdictions it is true that the defendant
controls discovery rights. If the defendant does not himself request
36
discovery, the government is not entitled to discovery.
This
allocation of the triggering power is at least ex ante pro-defendant:
where the defendant believes he will learn less from the government
than the government will learn from him, he can avoid this by not
requesting discovery. This triggering right, though, is offset by other
involuntary disclosure requirements. In the federal system, the
defendant is required to give notice of an alibi or an insanity
37
defense.
New Jersey’s requirements are even broader: the
defendant must give notice of alibis and a large number of defenses,
including renunciation of criminal purpose, ignorance, mistake, and
38
insanity, among others.
Discovery rules are not the only place where the rules of criminal
officers. John C. Douglass, Balancing Hearsay and Criminal Discovery, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2097, 2147-50 (2000). Professor Douglass focuses on federal cases, but his
observation would appear true even for state systems where grand juries are not used,
for the government is presumably much better equipped to use its investigative
agents to collect information before trial than defense counsel, at least in most cases.
33
N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(c) (Gann 2003).
34
N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(d) (Gann 2003).
35
See N.Y. CRIM. P. L. §§ 240.20, 240.30 & 240.45.
36
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1) (allowing government discovery only after
the defendant has requested similar discovery); N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(b) (permitting
defendant to waive discovery from government and thereby avoid disclosure
obligations).
37
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 & 12.2.
38
N.J. CT. R. 3:12-1 & 3:12-2 (Gann 2003).
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procedure take a different form than they would if we assumed that
the rules should generally be designed to avoid erroneous convictions
with little regard to erroneous acquittals. For instance, in the realm
of evidence, one might be surprised to see Federal Rules of Evidence
413 and 414, which admit evidence of prior sexual misconduct. After
all, the general approach of the federal rules, at least in theory, is that
uncharged misconduct evidence (uncharged in the sense that it is
39
not charged in this particular case) is generally inadmissible.
Of
course, in practice, such evidence is often admissible, either because
it is admissible for “other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
40
absence of mistake or accident,” or because it is admitted to
41
impeach a defendant who testifies. Nonetheless, the clear import of
Rules 413 and 414 is to increase the admissibility of such evidence in
sexual assault and child molestation cases. Couple this with Rule 412,
which is designed to exclude evidence of the victim’s prior acts, and
we have a regime that can hardly be called pro-defendant.
What I hope these examples illustrate is that particular rules in
criminal litigation are often far less protective of defendants than we
might predict if the only goal of criminal justice was to avoid
inaccurate convictions. For that very reason, many would argue that
these rules, as well as others, are normatively unsound. I take away a
different conclusion, though.
Many of the rules of criminal
procedure, in particular the privilege against self-incrimination and
the double jeopardy rules, already heavily favor the defendant. In
fact, it may well be that such rights and privileges are too skewed in
42
the favor of the defendant. Once we recall this background, it may
be far more easy to understand why so many other rights in criminal
practice and procedure do not favor defendants, at least to the extent
43
that some would advocate.
What I have said so far suggests that the rules governing the
prosecution and defense of criminal cases tend to strike a balance
between the criminal justice system’s need for accuracy and its need

39

See FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
41
FED. R. EVID. 609.
42
For arguments pro and con as to the privilege against self-incrimination, see
Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective, in THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 181, 182-83 & nn. 9 & 10
(1997).
43
This is similar to Bill Stuntz’s observation that the rules of criminal procedure
themselves often influence the substantive criminal law. See William J. Stuntz,
Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISSUES 1, 7-19 (1996).
40
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for convictions. If this is true, the rule proposed by Professor
Friedman—liberal admissibility of defense expert testimony—has the
potential to upset that balance. This is because such a standard is
likely to lower the number of convictions, but, I think, unlikely to do
so in a way that enhances accuracy. Imagine for the moment that at
the present time, the allocation of verdicts is as set forth in Table 1:
TABLE 1

Convicted
Acquitted

Guilty
Defendants
90
10

Not Guilty
Defendants
1
9

In this model, we have ninety defendants who are accurately
convicted and ten who are erroneously acquitted, along with one
defendant who is inaccurately convicted and nine who are correctly
44
acquitted. The precise numbers do not matter; what is important is
that we recognize that at present there are defendants who fit into all
four categories.
What is the effect of a rule of liberal admission of defense expert
evidence? The overall number of convictions should go down (there
is little reason to think that it will rise, and perhaps even less reason
to think that the effect is neutral). Furthermore, there is little reason
to believe that such a change will improve accuracy overall. Assuming
that at present the number of erroneous convictions is relatively low,
any reduction in the conviction rate should actually decrease accuracy.
For instance, we might imagine that the result of such a change in
the rules of admissibility could result in the following distribution:

44

The actual allocation of guilty and innocent defendants at trial is difficult to
know. The conviction rate of approximately 80% in federal cases suggests, but by no
means proves, that about four times as many factually guilty defendants are tried
than factually innocent defendants. Lillquist, supra note 17, at 101 n.35. The
numbers in the table assume a slightly higher number of factually guilty defendants,
but a roughly equivalent conviction rate (82.7%). This reflects an assumption that
there are presently more erroneous acquittals than convictions, something else we
cannot know to be true.
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TABLE 2

Convicted
Acquitted

Guilty
Defendants
75
25

Not Guilty
Defendants
0
10

The net result is a lowering in the number of guilty defendants
who are convicted. First, it is not clear that, as a social matter, this is a
justifiable trade-off. One common assertion is that it is better that ten
45
guilty persons go free than one innocent person be convicted. But
in the above example, fifteen guilty persons are going free to spare
one innocent person; is that a trade-off we would accept? At best, the
46
commentators would appear to disagree. Of course, the numbers I
have given are completely speculative. In reality, the ratio of guilty to
innocent persons acquitted as a result of this change could either be
below 10:1 or higher than 10:1. But the fact that we do not know the
answer to this question should give us pause before concluding that
this is a desirable change.
Second, even if this turns out to be a good trade-off, the
47
resulting overall level of conviction may be socially undesirable. If
so, then the criminal justice system should react to Professor
Friedman’s change with another rule that will ratchet the number of
accurate convictions back up to ninety. What we cannot know in
advance is how this rule change will affect the number of not guilty
defendants who are convicted. While we can hope that the number
stays at zero, it is also possible that it goes up to two or three. Thus,
we might end up with the following distribution:

45

See Lillquist, supra note 17, at 105.
See id.
47
Of course, this assumes that a goal of the system is to obtain some number of
convictions. Certainly deterrence theorists would accept this, and consequentialists
more generally. Even many retributivists would probably accept this as a goal,
although not the only goal, and perhaps not as a goal to be valued in some
circumstances.
It does not follow from this premise, however, “that most defendants are guilty.”
Friedman, supra note 3, at 1050. In fairness, I am not sure if Professor Friedman
directs this response at Professor Park or myself, but nothing in my observations here
presuppose the guilt of the defendant. My assumption simply is that some
defendants are guilty, some defendants are not guilty, and that at least one goal of
the criminal justice system should be to distinguish between the two groups.
46
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TABLE 3

Convicted
Acquitted

Guilty
Defendants
90
10

Not Guilty
Defendants
3
7

If so, the net effect of Professor Friedman’s proposal is to
increase, not decrease, the number of innocent defendants who will
be convicted.
Of course, I do not know that any of these things I have
suggested will come to pass. But I think they are just as plausible as
assuming that the overall effect will be positive. Against that
background, it seems to me unwise to liberalize the admissibility of
defense expert testimony.
II. THE LIMITS OF BEST EVIDENCE
The other suggestion made by Professors Friedman and
Giannelli is that the admission of some government expert evidence
ought to be made more difficult on a “best evidence” principle: the
evidence should be excluded to ensure that the government will
48
undertake the proper validation testing of the evidence. As applied
to evidence that is presently admissible, I believe this suggestion is
49
problematic.
One difficulty with such an argument is that it confuses and
conflates the incentives of the government and those of the
government’s agents: prosecutors and, to a lesser extent here, the
police. As commentators have noted, the incentives of both these
groups do not always neatly match those of the government more
50
generally. In particular, prosecutors’ goals may be a combination of
a desire to reduce their own workloads, balanced by an ambition to
51
further their own careers. Their incentives to seek validation of
forensic evidence may be weak compared to their incentives to simply
shift resources to prosecuting other cases. After all, seeking
validation testing would require the exercise of time and resources
48

Friedman, supra note 3, at 1064-65; Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1110.
I take no position on whether such a rule might make sense for forensic
evidence that has not yet been ruled admissible.
50
See Daryl Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000); see also William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).
51
See Stuntz, supra note 50, at 535, 543.
49
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for an uncertain outcome, whereas simply altering their caseloads
would require much less risk. This does not mean no validation
testing would occur, just that low-level prosecutors are not likely to be
the parties pushing for it to occur.
To understand why this may be so, consider first the cases in
which the government will generally seek to admit forensic evidence.
Not all crimes are investigated in the same way. So, for instance, the
government places relatively little effort into apprehending the
perpetrators of most property crimes, but far more resources into
apprehending murderers. As a result, there are far higher clearance
52
rates in homicide cases than in property crime cases. It would seem
to follow naturally that forensic evidence should be no different than
the other aspects of criminal investigation: much less resources ought
to be invested in low-level cases. The result is that we would imagine
that such evidence plays a much larger role in murder and sexual
53
assault cases than it does in burglary cases.
In addition, as Professor Slobogin notes, the type of forensic
evidence that the government typically seeks to admit in a criminal
54
case focuses on identity: tying the defendant to the crime. Thus,
forensic evidence is typically used in serious criminal cases where
identity of the perpetrator is a contested issue. Excluding such
forensic evidence on a “best evidence” principle may give prosecutors
an incentive to move resources in other directions: toward cases
55
without identity issues or to less serious crimes. This means that the
greater effect of the exclusion of forensic evidence would be to upset
the selection of cases for prosecution, rather than increasing
validation testing.
Of course, top-level prosecutors—attorneys-general and district
attorneys—may have a more direct incentive to be concerned by the
exclusion of forensic evidence than their subordinates. If low-level
prosecutors are more likely to avoid cases involving forensic evidence
in the face of longer odds in winning convictions, the result should
be lower conviction rates in such cases. Furthermore, the very cases
in which this will occur are those that are the most likely to be salient
52

SAMUEL WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION 132-34 (3d ed.
1999).
53
So, for instance, one study reported that in 1985, fingerprint evidence led to
an arrest in only 300 out of 126,028 burglary cases. Id at 139.
54
Slobogin, supra note 3.
55
In state systems, the second move might be less likely, because prosecutors
there are expected to prosecute such crimes. But in the federal system it is a
plausible outcome, because prosecutors there generally have more freedom to pick
cases. See generally Stuntz, supra note 50, at 570.
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to the public—murder and rape cases—because those are the cases in
56
which such evidence is used. The top-level prosecutor, particularly
if she is elected, might have good reason to push for changes that
would make such forensic evidence admissible, so that the conviction
rate will rise.
The difficulty is that top-level prosecutors should have (at least)
two possible strategies they could pursue to achieve this goal. First,
they might request that the legislature fund additional validation
research. Alternatively, though, they could simply lobby for changes
in state evidence law that might make such evidence admissible,
despite the decision of state courts. There is evidence to suggest that
the second path is the more likely (but far less desirable) one.
In the field of evidence, the basic premise is that judges decide
57
the admissibility of evidence. If the judiciary had the sole power to
decide the admissibility of forensic evidence, then top-level
prosecutors might seek the first path (validation testing) because
there would be little hope that the second path (rule alteration)
would pay off. After all, lobbying for rule changes to the same judges
who made the rule in the first place does not seem too likely to
succeed. In practice, however, the authority for setting the rules of
evidence in the first place is often divided between the judiciary and
the legislature. For instance, under present federal law, the Supreme
Court and the Judicial Conference have the responsibility for
prescribing the rules of evidence and procedure in the federal
58
system.
But that power is limited—at least practically—by a
congressional veto: the Supreme Court must submit such proposed
rules to Congress, and Congress can, and has, taken steps to block
the implementation of certain rules and to even impose alternative
59
rules.
Perhaps the most prominent example involved the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. After the Supreme
Court promulgated the original draft of the rules in 1972 and
submitted them to Congress, Article V of those rules (the evidentiary
privilege rules) were rejected in their entirety, and Congress
60
subsequently enacted the other Rules after rewriting many of them.
56

See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
FED R. EVID. 104(a).
58
28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 & 2073 (2000); see also Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing “The
Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking”, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 846 (2002).
59
On the requirement to submit proposed rules to Congress, see 28 U.S.C. §
2074 (2000).
60
See Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 88 (2002); see
also Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance—Testimonial Privileges and
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 772-77 (2002); Scallen, supra note
57

1202

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:1189

At the state level, the authority to decide the rules of evidence is
also mixed. In some jurisdictions, the rules of evidence are codebased: passed by state legislatures and signed into law by the
61
Governor. In other states, the rules of evidence are still primarily
judge-made, either through judicially promulgated rules of evidence
62
or through common-law decision-making.
Even in places where
judges retain primary authority for setting forth the rules of evidence,
63
the legislature may have the power to enact specific rules.
Recognizing that the judiciary does not unilaterally decide the
rules of evidence, but rather is either part of a cooperative process
with the legislature, or even simply the recipient of legislatively
constructed rules, raises the real possibility that top-level prosecutors
may prefer to lobby the legislature for rule changes rather than for
funds for validation testing of forensic evidence. This is because the
payoff from a rule change is both immediate and definitely positive,
whereas the payoff from validation testing is both remote and
uncertain. So, for instance, legislation mandating the admissibility of
fingerprint evidence would instantaneously make such evidence
admissible. Validation testing of fingerprint evidence, however,
would make such evidence admissible only after a lengthy period of
time for study, and even then there would be no guarantee that the
evidence would be, in fact, validated. With these very different
payoffs, it would seem that prosecutors have a strong incentive to pick
the rule-change strategy. Thus, it is not surprising that even today,
when defendants are increasingly mounting attacks on the
admissibility of forensic evidence, the Department of Justice has
64
remained slow to fund validation testing.

58, at 854. On the history of the rules as a whole, see 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5006, pp. 10609 (1977). For a contemporaneous view, see James Wm. Moore & Helen I. Bendix,
Congress, Evidence and Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J. 9 (1974). For a broader history of the
evidence rules, see Scallen, supra note 58, at 845-56.
61
In 1984, Professor Margaret Berger reported that at least eleven states had
passed evidentiary statutes. Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining
and Refining the Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 256 nn. 4, 7 & 8 (1984).
62
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE – A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 4.3.1 (2002).
63
There appear to be some jurisdictions in which the judiciary alone, as a result
of state constitutional law, has the power to determine at least some rules of
evidence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Ky. 1987);
Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406, 408-09 (N.J. 1950). Even in these jurisdictions,
though, the judiciary may defer to legislative decisions in some circumstances. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Reneer, 724 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Ky. 1987); Passaic County Prob.
Officers’ Ass’n v. County of Passaic, 374 A.2d 449 (N.J. 1977).
64
Margaret Berger, Remarks at the Seton Hall Law Review Symposium, Expert
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Furthermore, past experience suggests that legislatures will be
willing to respond to such lobbying. For instance, the privilege rules
proposed for the Federal Rules of Evidence were removed as the
65
result of heavy post-Watergate lobbying. The history of the federal
sexual crimes rules is similarly instructive. Rules 413, 414, and 415
were created by Congress as part of the Violent Crime Control and
66
Law Enforcement Act of 1994.
Under that act, the Judicial
Conference was to submit to Congress within 150 days of the passage
of the act a report responding to the new rules. In the event that the
Judicial Council’s recommendations differed from the rules as set
forth in the act, the act’s rules were to become effective 150 days after
the report, unless, of course, Congress took other action. As it
happened, the Judicial Conference urged rejection and/or
modification of the rules. In particular, the Judicial Conference
believed that the rules would lead to the admission of unfairly
prejudicial evidence and would result in “mini-trials” on the alleged
67
prior acts. Congress, though, took no action (probably because the
68
rules themselves were politically popular) , which resulted in the
implementation of the rules. I am not suggesting that the rules were
normatively justifiable. Certainly the weight of academic commentary
and the near-unanimous opinion of three separate Advisory
Committees (Evidence, Civil Rules, and Criminal Rules) suggest that
69
they were not. But the politically responsive branches—Congress
and the Executive (here represented by the Department of Justice)—
70
supported the rules.
As with the history of Article V, this story
implies that Congress—and probably other legislatures as well—will
be sensitive to complaints of evidence law made by law enforcement
groups.
Imagine for a moment, that Judge Pollak had stuck to his

Admissibility: Keeping Gates, Goals and Promises (February 21, 2003).
65
See supra text accompanying notes 58-63; see also Scallen, supra note 58, at 854.
66
Scallen, supra note 58, at 855-56.
67
Report Submitted to Congress in Accordance with Section 320935 of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, reproduced in FED. R. EVID.
413, historical notes (West 2002).
68
See Paul C. Rice, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence: Tending to the
Past and Pretending to the Future?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 817, 841 n.59 (2002) (noting that
the rules were enacted “to give the appearance that those who supported [them]
were tough[] on the kind of crimes of concern to voters”).
69
But see Roger Park, The Crime Bill of 1994 and the Law of Character Evidence:
Congress Was Right About Consent Defense Cases, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 271 (1995)
(supporting rules).
70
See David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and
Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15 (1994).

1204

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:1189

71

decision in United States v. Llera Plaza, limiting the testimony of the
government’s fingerprint examiners and forbidding them from
72
opining that a particular print is from a particular person. Even if
other federal judges did not follow the decision, or if it was eventually
overturned on appeal, it seems to me at least possible, if not likely,
that Congress would have quickly passed legislation entitled
something like the Latent Fingerprint Admissibility Act of 2002. The
Justice Department strongly opposed the initial decision in Llera Plaza
and would no doubt have lobbied on behalf of such a bill. Given the
recent success of the Justice Department in achieving other changes
to criminal procedure rules, most prominently in the USA PATRIOT
Act, I believe there is good reason to assume such an act would pass.
More importantly, such an act might well be worse than what we have
now.
Furthermore, there is good reason to suspect that, at least at the
present time, calls to eliminate many other types of forensic evidence
might meet a similar fate. Although I am not currently aware of any
data on the issue—and thus my speculation is no doubt inadmissible
under Daubert—I believe that there are good anecdotal reasons to
speculate that society as a whole feels comfortable with much forensic
evidence. After all, two of the most popular current shows on
television are C.S.I. and C.S.I.: Miami, which both rely heavily for plot
development on some of the very types of forensic evidence that this
Symposium finds objectionable. Against this background, it is quite
plausible to believe that Congress (and state legislatures) would have
little problem overruling other decisions excluding forensic evidence
that is presently admissible.
CONCLUSION
There appears to be little debate that the existing law of expert
admissibility in criminal cases is flawed. The real question is how to
fix it. I suspect that at least some judicially-created solutions are likely
to fail, because their negative consequences are likely to outweigh
their benefits. That does not mean, though, that reform is not
possible, particularly if carefully crafted. To achieve this goal, I
believe that close attention must be paid to the likely consequences of
such actions. The best way to avoid legislative responses to decisions
to exclude forensic evidence may be to obtain popular opinion in
favor of such changes. Thus, the proper parties to whom such
71

2002 WL 27305 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002), vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa.
2002).
72
Id. at *18.
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arguments should be first made are not practitioners, academics, or
judges, but rather the public at large. Publicizing the ineffective
nature of a type of forensic evidence will have far more impact on its
admissibility than legal discussion about the proper way to apply
Daubert, particularly if alterations to the existing structure of forensic
evidence admissibility have the unintended consequences I have
suggested.
Therefore, I believe it is no coincidence that the one place
where forensic evidence has been successfully challenged,
handwriting evidence, is the same place where Professors Denbeaux,
Risinger and Sacks have created “an academic assembly of all the
73
data.” Only by undertaking similar assemblies in other fields are
challenges to admissibility likely to be successful.

73

D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of
Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 138 (2000).

